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8.1  Introduction 
Public  institutions of  higher  education have grown  in prominence  in the 
United States over the past 200 years. By the mid-l980s, total public enroll- 
ments were roughly twice the level of private enrollments. ’ Important as they 
are, these aggregate trends mask the substantial and systematic state-by-state 
variation in public and private  enrollments that is the primary focus of  this 
paper. 
The outputs associated with public higher education are notoriously  diffi- 
cult to conceptualize  and to quantify. We  therefore concentrate attention on 
input measures that can proxy for educational output: enrollments per capita 
and expenditures per student. 
To  a large extent, current enrollment levels reflect a historical set of deci- 
sions  by  state legislatures  concerning  the  appropriate  “supply”  of  public 
higher education.  But they also depend on the demand for higher education 
by both residents and nonresidents. In this paper, we relate the 1985 statewide 
pattern  of publicly provided  higher education to the political conditions and 
choices that have confronted legislatures, along with the labor market condi- 
tions and other economic forces that affect students’ (and families’) demands 
for higher education. 
John M. Quigley is professor of economics and public policy at the University of  California, 
Berkeley. Daniel L. Rubinfeld is professor of economics and law at the University of  California, 
Berkeley. 
Support for this research was provided by  the National Bureau of Economic Research and the 
Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics, University of California, Berkeley. The paper ben- 
efited from the suggestions of Norton Grubb and Charles Clotfelter. Maya Ibser provided valuable 
research assistance. 
1.  Public  enrollments  averaged  1,166,934 per  state,  while  private  enrollments  averaged 
620,87 I. 
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Section 8.2 provides  the conceptual overview. We  sketch out some of the 
alternative political-economic  theories that might serve to explain the current 
pattern of  student enrollments. Section 8.3 begins the empirical analysis by 
describing the statewide public enrollment pattern as it has developed histori- 
cally and as it relates to other input and output measures  (expenditures per 
pupil and a quality index). In this section, we flesh out the public-choice prob- 
lem of the legislature which causes states to provide alternative packages of 
postsecondary education services. Section 8.4  describes the regression analy- 
ses that attempt to sort out the effects of  legislative supply variables from the 
important demand-oriented  variables. Some brief concluding remarks appear 
in the final section. 
8.2  Why Public Provision? 
Enrollment patterns  are in part historically determined; additionally,  they 
are intricately related to the availability of private institutions in or near each 
state.  As a result, there is no single, simple theory that is likely  to explain 
fully  the variation  in interstate  public  enrollment  rates.  In  this  section, we 
sketch out a number of alternative theoretical views that might help to explain 
the existing spending-enrollment  pattern.  The theories also serve to explain 
why states choose to provide subsidized higher education at all, in light of the 
economic evidence suggesting that most of the benefits of college training are 
fully captured by the graduates themselves.2 
One approach  emphasizes human capital and mobility. According to this 
view, states wishing to import valuable human capital will provide relatively 
high  levels of public  spending and enrollment  opportunities,  at least to the 
extent that they believe they can convince graduates of the public institutions 
to continue to reside in their states. 
A second public-choice  explanation concentrates  on the political benefits 
associated  with  the provision  of  higher education. According  to this  view, 
politicians  use  logrolling  to trade for forms of  public higher education  that 
benefit their constituencies.  California’s increased emphasis on the provision 
of two-year institutions is consistent with this view; logrolling may have led 
to the creation of  a large number of  new  institutions in a sufficiently large 
number of  legislative districts  so as to make the entire educational package 
politically viable. This theory is also consistent with the Leviathan theory of 
big government, according to  which political support by self-interested bu- 
reaucrats may be sufficient to cause the subsidized public sector to grow. 
A third perspective  (taken by Bowles and Gintis  1976, for example) sug- 
gests that subsidies to higher education are simply a means that the capitalist 
2. See, for example, the discussion  in  Douglas (1977). He  argues that the average private 
economic return on higher education has been falling and is just above the break-even point. This 
does suggest, however, that for the lower-paying professions, the return is negative, which might 
provide an additional motive for subsidizing higher education-especially  two-year institutions. 245  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
class has of distributing  state resources  to the middle class.  Karabel  (1974) 
follows this line of  reasoning  to explain the emergence of two-year  institu- 
tions as a means of keeping the working class “in their place.” The growing 
emphasis on two-year institutions, especially in the West, could be consistent 
with this view, but the theory does not explain why such institutions have been 
so successful in other areas of the country. 
Yet  another explanation for higher-education  subsidies relies on the inher- 
ent optimism of the lower and middle socioeconomic classes concerning their 
own prospects of moving up the economic ladder. This optimism, we believe, 
helps to explain the widespread historical support for assessing relatively low 
marginal tax rates on upper-middle-income  individuals. In general, to the ex- 
tent that lower- and middle-income groups are unusually optimistic, they may 
vote (directly or indirectly) to support subsidies which tum out ex post to be 
detrimental to their narrow “class interests.” 
Finally, it is important to recognize the rather unusual place that education 
plays in our society. To  some, education is a form of  private secular religion; 
as such it may receive substantial political support, regardless of  the calculus 
of  immediate benefits. 
8.3  Interstate Variation in Public Higher Education 
8.3.1  A Historical Perspective 
Higher education  in the United  States was provided  entirely through  the 
private sector in the early years of  the republic. Beginning with Harvard Uni- 
versity in 1636, a total of nine private institutions had come into existence by 
the time of the American  Revolution.  The 75 years following the revolution 
was a period of  great expansion, and  by  1861 over 800 colleges  had been 
founded. However, most of  these colleges lacked either the faculty, students, 
or funding to survive; in  1900 only about  180 were in existence (Westmeyer 
1985). 
The first public institution of  higher education was founded in  1816 (it is 
now  the  University  of  Virginia).  At  the time, there was  little demand-side 
pressure,  since relatively  few students were completing college preparatory 
programs. However, the role of public institutions became far more important 
with the passage of the first Morrill Act in 1862, creating the land-grant col- 
leges. The Morrill Acts (the second was in 1890) mandated support for at least 
one college devoted to agriculture and the mechanical arts in every state, with 
land  and funds provided  by  the  federal government.  Some states used  this 
support to expand existing colleges; others used  it to  establish new  institu- 
tions. 
Public institutions would most likely have been prominent earlier, were it 
not for the precedent of the Dartmouth College case of  1819. In that case, the 
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and that assumption of such authority amounted to a breach of contract with 
those institutions. If the court had ruled otherwise, it seems likely that instead 
of the subsequent proliferation of private institutions, states would have taken 
control of (and made “public”) many existing institutions. 
The next great expansion in the number of  institutions of  higher learning 
came after World War 11, when the GI Bill facilitated great increases in enroll- 
ments. Since that war, enrollments have fluctuated, in part in response to eco- 
nomic and demographic  change^.^ 
8.3.2  Variations in Public and Private Enrollments 
Much of the empirical research on higher education has focused on enroll- 
ments,  in both  four-year and two-year  institutions  (see, e.g., Christensen, 
Melder, and Weisbrod  1975; Corazzini, Dugan, and Grabowski  1972; Cor- 
man  1983; Hopkins 1974; Hoenack and Pierro 1990). Enrollment studies, in 
turn, have tended to concentrate on the micro decisions of students (enroll- 
ment  is  related  to  income,  tuition,  and  the  opportunity  cost  of  attending 
school) (see Feldman and Hoenack 1969; Galper and Dunn 1969; Kohn, Man- 
ski, and Mundel 1976; Mattila 1982; Sulock 1982; Weiss 1972). The “supply 
side” is usually given exogenously in terms of tuition, quality of schools, and 
state and federal support for public education. The only endogenous variable 
involves the decision rule for admitting students. 
We take a broader view in this paper, emphasizing the legislative decision 
involved in providing a statewide system of public higher education. We use 
the level of student enrollments per 1,000 population in  1984-85  as a means 
of comparing the opportunities for public education across states. (Through- 
out the paper, enrollments per 1,000 population will be referred to as enroll- 
ment per ~apita.)~ 
The range and variability of public and private enrollments is striking. Per 
capita enrollments range from a low of 25.1 in Georgia to a high of 61.7 in 
Arizona  (and 55.4 in California), with a mean  of  39.3. The coefficient of 
variation is 20.8 percent. The variability of private enrollments is even greater, 
ranging  from per capita enrollments as low as 0 in  Wyoming and 0.32 in 
Nevada to enrollments as high as 40.5 in Massachusetts (and 35.8 in Rhode 
Island). In contrast to public enrollments, the coefficient of variation for per 
capita private enrollments is 78.2 percent. 
Figure 8.1 shows how public enrollments per capita vary by region of the 
3. For a more detailed description and analysis of the sources of enrollment changes, see Clot- 
felter (1991), chapters 1 and 5. 
4. Enrollment per capita allows one to conceptualize education as benefiting all state residents. 
The alternative enrollment rate, as measured by  the ratio of  enrollments to population aged  18- 
30, focuses more directly on the choices that potential students make. This choice is unsatisfac- 
tory, since it fails to account for the fact that older students are a growing portion of  college 
students. According to Corman and Davidson (1984), over 33 percent of college students were 25 
and older in 1979, and the number is expected to increase to 43 percent by 1990. In any case, the 
results were essentially unchanged, whichever variable was utilized. 247  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
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Fig. 8.1  Public enrollment per capita by region 
country. (Each of the 50 states appears on the horizontal  axis.) Clearly, the 
mean enrollment rate increases as we move from the East to the South, Mid- 
west, and West. Within each region, however, there remains substantial vari- 
ation. In the East, for example, enrollment rates range from a low of 25.4 in 
Pennsylvania to a high of 46.0 in Maryland. By contrast, the range in the West 
is from a low of 34.7 in Idaho to a high of 61.7 in Arizona. 
There is also a pronounced regional pattern in private enrollments, as figure 
8.2 shows. Per capita private enrollments are substantially higher in the East 
than elsewhere.  Among the other three regions, enrollment rates are highest 
in the  Midwest, followed by the South, and  then  the West. There remains 
substantial variation within the East, with the lowest private enrollment rate 
of  7.1 in Connecticut  and the highest, 40.5, in Massachusetts. By contrast, 
with the exception of Utah in the West, there is relatively little within-region 
variation in private enrollment rates. 
These important regional differences in higher education were largely his- 
torically  determined, as figures 8.3 and 8.4 suggest. These figures describe 
enrollment rates by order of statehood, from 1st to 50th. The positive relation- 
ship between public enrollment and order of statehood, and the corresponding 
negative relationship for private enrollment rates, is immediately clear.5 
From a cross-sectional viewpoint, one might view each state as making (or 
having made) a “public choice” about the mix of  public and private enroll- 
ments  to provide.  (Alternatively,  the legislature makes  a public  enrollment 
5. When we  attempted to sort out geography (region) from history (order of  statehood) by 
examining the pattern of enrollment rates within region by  order of statehood, we found no dis- 
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Fig. 8.2  Private enrollment per capita by  region 
State 
Fig. 8.3  Public enrollment per capita by order of statehood 
choice, conditioned on the availability of private alternatives.)  The enrollment 
trade-off is shown in figure 8.5. Overall, there is a negative relationship be- 
tween public and private enrollment rates, ranging from the low-public, high- 
private  extreme of  Massachusetts  to the high-public,  low-private alternative 
of  Arizona. The relationship  appears to be nonlinear,  as shown by  the best- State 
Fig. 8.4  Private enrollment per capita by order of statehood 
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fitting hyperbola  that  appears in the  graph.h The relationship would not be 
substantially changed if  the South, where all enrollment rates are relatively 
low, were removed from the data set. 
8.3.3  The Mix of Educational Opportunities 
Within the public sector, states vary substantially in the mix of educational 
opportunities that they provide. Figure 8.6 provides one interesting perspec- 
tive  by  illustrating  the  generally  negative  relationship  between  enrollment 
rates for two-year and four-year institutions. This pattern has come about as 
the result of  a rapid increase in the enrollments in two-year institutions that 
occurred during the 1970s.’ By 1980,91 percent of students in two-year insti- 
tutions were in public as opposed to private schools; the comparable figure for 
four-year schools was 67 percent (Grubb 1988, 301-2). 
Four-year institutions should themselves be broken down into those that are 
primarily liberal arts teaching institutions (hereafter “colleges”) and those that 
emphasize research and offer extensive programs of doctoral studies. Of the 
1,993 four-year institutions in the United States, 150 are classified as research 
institutions;  38 percent  of  those  are  private  and  62 percent  public.  Of  the 
group of 1,843 colleges, 75 percent are private.* 
Once again, the current mix of institutions reflects historical development. 
Institutions with graduate programs are a phenomenon of  the last  100 years. 
Although  the first Ph.D. was awarded  at Yale in  1861, by  1930 only 2,024 
Ph.D.’s  had  been  awarded.  Graduate  enrollments  increased  more  substan- 
tially, from 198 in 1878 to 2,382 in 1890, 9,370 in  1910, and 47,255 in 1930. 
Two-year, or community, colleges are even more recent in their origin but 
have grown much faster. The first junior colleges were founded at the turn of 
the century, with 52 in existence in 1920, 610 in 1941, and 1,100  in 1970. 
8.3.4  The Public versus Private Choice 
There is, of  course, substantial variation in the quality of both public and 
private institutions. To  examine the quality issue, we rely upon the Gourman 
(1987) index measuring the proportion of rated institutions in each state clas- 
sified as “strong” or “good.”’ The Gourman index is based on the opinions of 
a substantial  number  of  individuals  active in  the  field of  higher  education 
about the quality of faculty, students, individual departments within a school, 
school administration, and library facilities. While such a subjective measure 
should be viewed with some skepticism, it is reassuring to note that the Gour- 
6.  The regression estimated curve in figure 8.5 plots the relationship: log(pub1ic enrollment per 
capita) = 3.8959 - . I181 log(private enrollment per capita). 
7. According to Grubb (1988), enrollments in two-year institutions grew at a rate of  11 percent 
per year during the 1970s, as compared to a 2 percent annual rate of growth for four-year colleges. 
The source is the Statistical abstract o/the United States, table 260. 
8. Of the 1,305  two-year institutions, only 28 percent are private. 
9. An index of  the number of institutions rated “good’ and “strong” yielded similar results. 251  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
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man index is reasonably  highly correlated  with other objective measures of 
quality.  In 
According to our constructed measure of  quality, Arizona, California, and 
Iowa have the highest-quality  public  institutions,  and Colorado, Rhode Is- 
land, and Massachusetts the highest-quality private institutions."  Figures 8.7 
and 8.8 show that there is a generally positive relationship  between quality 
and enrollment rates; those states with institutions of  the highest quality tend 
to have the highest enrollments. 
The public choice between public and private, high- and low-quality insti- 
10. Solmon (1973, table  1) found the overall Gourman index to have a correlation of  .80 with 
average faculty salary; .62 with the SAT math score of enrolled students; .75 with the departmen- 
tal research, instruction, and library expenditures; and .71 with basic expenditures. 
1 I. The Gourman rating system considers all schools in a state. The quality index used here is 
unweighted. The results were quite similar when an  index of the total number of highly rated 
schools was used in its place. 252  John M. Quigley and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 
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Fig. 8.7  Public enrollment per capita and institutional quality 
tutions is more complex than any single graph can show. The listings in table 
8.1 make this clear.'* A group of  11 states, located  primarily  in the South, 
offer educational bundles consisting of low public and low private enrollments 
in schools that are not highly rated. A second group, 8 states primarily in the 
East, offer low public enrollment and high private-high-quality  bundles.  At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, a third group, 18 states located primarily in 
the Midwest and West, offer high public, often high-quality, but low private 
enrollment rates. Only 1 state, Illinois, would be classified as providing both 
high  public  and high  private  enrollment  rates.  The remaining  12 states lie 
someplace in between these sharply contrasting combinations. 
An alternative measure of  the quality of public and private  institutions  is 
given by an input to the educational production function: the dollar level of 
expenditures per student. Figure 8.9 shows that four-year private liberal arts 
colleges exhibit  a clear, positive  relationship between  per  student expendi- 
12. This classification was accomplished by dividing each enrollment series into three approxi- 
mately equal parts-high,  moderate, and low. 253  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
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Fig. 8.8  Private enrollment per capita and institutional quality 
tures and enrollment rates. Other things equal (e.g., tuition), this suggests that 
states  with  “better”  schools have  higher enrollments. I3  However,  as figure 
8.10 illustrates, the pattern is just the opposite for public education. Here we 
see a negative relationship  between expenditures per student and enrollment 
rates.I4 The suggestion  is that  some states opt to offer a high-quality,  low- 
quantity public education  alternative,  while others offer a low-quality, high- 
quantity combination.  Is 
Part of the public-choice decision that a legislature must make is the (joint) 
choice of  the level of tuition and the level of  public subsidy. To measure the 
subsidy for all schools, we use the state appropriation per full-time equivalent 
13. The same pattern holds for private four-year universities. 
14.  Alaska,  with a per capita expenditure of  $17,042, has been excluded as an  outlier. The 
negative relationship is somewhat less pronounced when Alaska is included. Note, in addition, 
that the relationship  is essentially  the same when expenditures per full-time equivalent (FTE) 
student at four-year universities is related to four-year public enrollments per capita. 
15. For two-year private institutions, there is no relationship between expenditures per student 
and enrollment rates, while for two-year public institutions, there is a slight positive relationship. 254  John M. Quigley and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 
Table 8.1  Classification of Enrollment by States 
Private Enrollment 
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Nores: States rated as having  high-quality  public  institutions are underlined;  those with  high- 
quality private institutions appear in bold print. A state may rate high in both categories. A state 
has high-quality public or private education if two or more institutions are rated good or excellent. 
student (SUPPB).  Ih  (See the Appendix  to this chapter for the definitions of 
and data sources for variables presented hereafter.) For two-year schools and 
four-year colleges (excluding research universities), we calculated the subsidy 
16. Unfortunately, we were unable to find direct meamres orthe  subsidy per two-year and four- 
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Fig. 8.9  Private four-year per capita enrollment and per student expenditure 
per full-time student (SUPP2 and SUPP4) as the difference between per stu- 
dent expenditures and average per student tuition. Subsidies vary substantially 
among states.  For two-year  schools, they  range  from a low of  $2,056 per 
student to a high of $6,590 (with a mean of  $3,723); for four-year colleges, 
they range from $1,864 to $15,101 (with a mean of $4,412). 
Tuition is a major component of  the price of  a public education  to a pro- 
spective student.” Figure 8.1  I  shows a negative relationship between the tui- 
tion at two-year public institutions and enrollment rates; states with the lowest 
tuition (and, other things equal, the lowest subsidies) have the highest enroll- 
ment.IX  The pattern is the same with respect to tuition and enrollment at four- 
year colleges (see figure 8.12).  l9 
17. But see Nerlove (1972) for a more complete discussion of  the relationship between tuition 
and the price that efficiently allocates scarce resources. 
18. Two-year public tuition was highest in  Pennsylvania ($3,595) and Vermont ($2,525) and 
lowest in California ($250), North Carolina ($382), and Montana ($420). 
19. Four-year tuitions ranged from a high of $3,547 in Vermont and $3,202 in New Hampshire 
to a low of $739 in Oklahoma and $740 in West Virginia. There is little relationship, however, 
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Fig. 8.10  Public four-year per capita enrollment and per student expenditure 
The level of  tuition and the subsidy represent  two sides of  a coin from a 
legislature’s point of  view; one can offer a low tuition and easy access to the 
system of higher education at a high budgetary cost, or one can cut budgetary 
costs by offering a high tuition. To  see how these policy choices vary among 
states, we calculated the ratio of  tuition to per student expenditures individu- 
ally for both  two-year  and four-year  nonuniversity  public  institutions.  The 
variation  in  both  was  substantial.  For  two-year  schools,  the  tuition-to- 
expenditure ratio varied from a low of 6.3 percent in California to a high of 
63.6 percent  in Pennsylvania  (with a mean  of  22.5 percent). For four-year 
colleges, the range ran from a low of  11.4 percent in Alaska to a high of 63.2 
percent in New Hampshire (with a mean of 28.3 percent). 
Interestingly,  these tuition rates  are positively correlated  with private per 
capita enrollments (the correlation coefficient is 0.3  1 for two-year institutions 
and 0.29 for four-year colleges). Thus, legislatures in states with substantial 
private alternatives tend to charge higher tuition than do states with relatively 
little  to offer  in the private  sector. These results are apparently  supply-side 
rather  than  demand-side driven.  Presumably,  providing  easy  access to  the 257  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
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Fig. 8.11  lbo-year public tuition and enrollment 
public sector is most important in states whose residents have little in the way 
of  in-state private-sector options. 
Note  the clear regional  pattern  to the levels of  tuition charged by  public 
systems of  higher  education. As the bar  cart in  figure  8.13 shows, public 
tuitions are lowest (and subsidies highest) in the West, while tuitions are at 
their peak in the East.*O Public tuitions in all regions are small in relationship 
to private tuitions. Figure 8.14 illustrates this, along with the fact that private 
tuitions are at their peak in the East and are lowest in the South. 
To  pursue the public-private analysis along a further dimension, we distin- 
guished between public tuition for state residents and nonresidential tuition. 
The general pattern can be seen in figures 8.15 and 8.16. The former shows 
the statewide variation in the ratio of  residential tuition to expenditures per 
FTE student; the latter shows the comparable ratio for nonresidential tuition. 
Because of  comparability issues, it is more instructive to make relative com- 
20. The pattern is unchanged when we deflate tuition by a cost-of-living index. 258  John M. Quigley and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 
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state 
Fig. 8.14  Public and private tuition by region 
Stale 
Fig. 8.15  Ratio of nonresidential tuition to expenditure per FTE public 
student 
parisons  than to reflect  on the difference  between  these ratios and the full- 
funding fraction, 1  .O.*' 
21. The former was given by TUITRIEXPLAPUB, the latter by TUITNRIEXPLAPUB. In both 
cases, we attempted to make the  1985 tuitions comparable to the  1988 expenditures, using the 
overall consumer price index to adjust. 260  John M. Quigley and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 
state 
Fig. 8.16  Ratio of residential tuition to expenditure per FTE public student 
There is substantial variation in the tuition  ratios.  Of the states reporting, 
resident tuition ratios are the highest in South Dakota, New Hampshire, and 
Indiana. The residential  tuition  ratios  are  several  multiples  higher  than  the 
states with the lowest tuition  ratios-California,  New Mexico, and Tennes- 
see. Similarly, the highest nonresident tuition ratios occur in New Hampshire, 
Colorado, Massachusetts, and Oregon, while the lowest occur in  Alabama, 
Missouri, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Overall, these two ratios are posi- 
tively correlated as one would expect: states can generally be labeled as high- 
tuition or low-tuition  states. One might expect to find that states use tuition 
rates  (a) as a means of  attracting  talented  out-of-state  students  who might 
choose to reside  permanently in the  state and  (6)  as a means of extracting 
payment from talented  in-state students who might choose to leave the state 
after receiving a subsidized education. However, we found very little correla- 
tion between  mobility and other demographic  variables and the tuition ratio 
variables.22 
Finally, we conclude this section with an unsettling,  yet important, issue. 
We have carried out our statistical analysis on the presumption that there is a 
clearly  defined distinction  between  public  and  private  higher education. In 
fact, the distinction  has always been a fuzzy one. The definition  of what is 
public and what is private actually differs from state to state; the key distinc- 
tion  is  control, not  funding.23 A  public  institution  is  publicly  controlled 
22. The exception is the proportion of  the population that  is black and the proportion that is 
23. The distinction was a central issue in the Darrmoufh College case, in which colleges, once 
Hispanic. Both were negatively correlated with both tuition ratios. 
chartered, were protected from state control. See Hofstadter and Smith (1961) for details. 261  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
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Fig. 8.17  Per student state support for private institutions 
whether publicly or privately funded. Correspondingly, a private institution is 
privately controlled even if partly subsidized by public funds. As evidence of 
the confusion that would arise if funding were the source of the public-private 
distinction, examine figure 8.17. The bar graph illustrates the extremely wide 
divergence in per student public support for private institutions.  Public sup- 
port is very substantial  in the eastern and midwestern  states of New Jersey, 
Michigan, Maryland, and New  York, yet essentially  nonexistent  in a large 
number of  states, many of which are located in New England and the West. 
Overall, state public  support  for private higher  education  is  highest in  the 
Midwest and the East and lowest in the West. It is strongly negatively corre- 
lated with the mobility of  the student population,  a result consistent with the 
view that such subsidies may be most advantageous when given to a group of 
students that reside within the state. 
Having discussed  the relationships  between  enrollments  and some of  the 
important enrollment determinants, we now move to the statistical analysis of 
the statewide pattern of public enrollments. 
8.4  An Econometric Model of Public Choices in Public Higher 
Education 
The per capita public enrollment rate in a given state will be determined by 
the interaction of  demand (students’ choices) and supply (legislative choices). 
Further, both choices are highly dependent on the historical development of 262  John M. Quigley and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 
private  colleges and ~niversities.~~  Unfortunately,  the theories  that we have 
sketched out do not provide us with a clear set of restrictions that allow us to 
identify demand and supply variables. We have attempted to make these dis- 
tinctions, nevertheless,  in order to relate our work to earlier literature and to 
provide some preliminary  tests of the underlying theory. Caution should be 
used  in reaching  conclusions about structural  parameters  from the  analysis 
that follows. 
From the demand perspective, we expect the dependent  variable, the per 
capita public enrollment rates (ENB), to be negatively related to the opportu- 
nity  cost of getting an education, as represented by the unemployment rate 
(UNEMP), so that the coefficient of  UNEMP would be positive. Similarly, as 
Hoenack and Weiler (1  979) suggest, a higher unemployment rate may provide 
evidence of  an increased value of a college degree (especially at a two-year 
school). 
On the  other hand,  higher  unemployment  rates  may  be  associated  with 
lower family incomes, which would reduce the demand for higher education. 
We  also expect the ENB to be positively  related  to the opportunity  to find 
jobs.  The  number  of  service  jobs  per  capita  (SERV)  provides  one job- 
opportunity  index. Given  the  employment trend  away  from manufacturing 
and toward the service sector, states with a higher proportion of service jobs 
are more likely, other things the same, to have job openings when economic 
conditions are good.25 
With respect to the financing of  public higher education, we expect enroll- 
ment rates to be negatively related to the direct out-of-pocket cost of education 
(average public tuition, TUITB, or the vector of tuition variables TCLAPUB 
[median tuition at four-year colleges] and T2YRPUB [median tuition at two- 
year public  institution^]).^^ 
Enrollments should also be positively related to the quality of  public insti- 
tutions in the state, as represented by the quality rating (QUALB) and by the 
level of expenditures per  student (EXB). For all public  schools-and  two- 
year schools, where location is an important issue-we  would also expect the 
cost of alternative private education (TUITV, or TCLAPRI-the  median tui- 
tion  at four-year colleges-and  T2YRPRI-the  median tuition at two-year 
institutions)  and  the  level  of  competing private  expenditures  per  student 
(EXV) to be relevant. 
Finally, we have also included as a demand-determining  variable the pro- 
24.  Thus, order of entry into statehood is highly correlated with enrollment rates. Order of 
entry is also highly correlated with a number of “demand” and “supply” variables. Consequently, 
we have chosen to present our results in terms of the latter. If order of  statehood were added as an 
additional explanatory variable, it would be highly insignificant in both the demand and supply 
equations. 
25. We  found a host of  other job-mix  variables to be  statistically insignificant and  to have 
insubstantial coefficients. 
26. Corman and Davidson (1984) relate enrollment rates in two-year and four-year colleges to 
tuition, unemployment, and income. Sulock (1982) has a similar analysis of community colleges. 263  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
portion of the population aged 18-24  (YOUNG). This variable not only mea- 
sures the demand of the most relevant subgroup of the population but also has 
the effect of translating our dependent variable, enrollments per capita, into 
an enrollment rate per population aged 18  to 24.27 
From the legislative supply perspective, we expect higher enrollment rates 
to provide direct social benefits of  higher education to the state as well as 
benefits to legislators who are responding to the interest groups made up of 
potential  students (and their families) and potential employers.28  Thus, we 
would expect a positive relationship between the enrollment rate and income 
(INC) and the percentage of the population that is in the  18-24  age group 
(YOUNG). 
We  would also expect a positive relationship between the enrollment rate 
and the elasticity of the state’s tax base (ELAST80);29  a state is likely to find 
it politically easier to raise revenues to finance public education if  state reve- 
nues are likely to increase substantially with growth (thus obviating the need 
to raise tax rates).30  In addition, we expect a negative relationship between the 
relative price of goods in the state (PRICE) and the public subsidy to educa- 
tion (SUPPB). 
Other variables that would arguably affect legislative supply are the propor- 
tions of  the population that are black (BLACK) and Hispanic (HISP), as mi- 
nority groups might provide political pressure, especially with respect to the 
provision of two-year educational opportunities; the proportion of the popu- 
lation that is located in metropolitan areas (METRPOP), since the more ur- 
banized the population, the greater access that students are likely to have to 
public higher education opportunities, especially for two-year schools; and a 
measure of the mobility of the population (MOBIL), because the more mobile 
the population, the lower the proportion of public benefits that reach citizens 
of the state.31  This effect of mobility is likely to be masked, however, by the 
fact that MOBIL also provides a measure of  the recent growth in  a state’s 
population, which  we  would expect to be positively related to enrollment 
We have also included the (endogenous) level of public tuition in the legis- 
lative supply equation, but its effect is certainly ambiguous. On one hand, a 
higher tuition provides more revenue and therefore lowers the financial pres- 
sures on the state. (Part of this effect will be reflected statistically, by the inclu- 
sion of the state appropriations variable.) On the other hand, a lower tuition 
supply- 
27. The translation would be exact if the enrollment variables were in logarithmic form. Thus, 
28. See Hoenack and  Pierro (1990) for a recent application of interest group theory to  the 
legislative supply of public higher education in Minnesota. 
29. It is, of course, possible that ELASTLO could itself be affected by the enrollment rate. We 
found that making ELAST80 an  endogenous variable did not change any results significantly. 
30. Clotfelter (1976) tests a different version of the “fiscal illusion” hypothesis. He finds a very 
small, insignificant relationship between his measure of  tax complexity (a Herfindahl index cal- 
culated using nine categories of taxation) and per capita expenditures on higher education. 
log(ENB/POP) -  lOg(POP18-24/POP) = log(ENB/POP18-24). 264  John M. Quigley and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 
provides greater opportunities for students of all socioeconomic strata to ob- 
tain  a  public  education, an important goal  for the  state  systems of  public 
higher education. The former argument would be consistent with a positive 
coefficient on TUITB, while the latter would suggest a negative coefficient. 
Finally, we have chosen not to include a direct measure of private-sector alter- 
natives in our supply equation; we see the private-public  distinction as more 
of a demand-side phenomenon. Nevertheless, we have tested alternative mod- 
els in which per capita private enrollment (ENV) does appear as an additional 
variable. 
We believe that tuition and public expenditures per student are most reason- 
ably specified as endogenous variables. We also wanted to allow for a nonzero 
error covariance  between  demand and  supply equations.  We  therefore esti- 
mated the student demand and legislative demand equations using three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) as well  as ordinary least squares (OLS), the latter for 
comparison purposes. All of the variables that appear in the regression analy- 
ses are defined in table 8.2.  The OLS and 3SLS results for overall enrollment 
rates are given in tables 8.3 and 8.4.32  Results that are specific to two- and 
four-year institutions appear in tables 8.5 and 8.6. These were estimated using 
seemingly unrelated  estimation, to account for the expected  negative  cross- 
equation negative error c~rrelation.~~ 
8.4.  I  Student Demand 
As expected, public tuition has a negative effect on the enrollment rates. 
The price elasticity of demand is about -  0.20, obtained from the three-stage 
least squares regression,  and suggests that overall student enrollment demand 
is price insensitive.  Note, however (from table 8.5) that student demand for 
two-year enrollment has a substantially higher price elasticity, one that is con- 
sistent with  several earlier studies.  (Obviously, four-year enrollment  is very 
insensitive to price; the elasticity is -  0.04.) Finally, note that overall public 
enrollment is a substitute for private enrollment, since the sign on the private 
tuition variable is positive. (The cross-price elasticity, however, is quite low) 
Many of the other variables in the demand equation had the expected effect 
on enrollment demand. Higher per student expenditures and quality both in- 
crease student demand substantially.  Consistent with the view that public and 
private education are substitutable to some extent, we find that higher private 
expenditures, tuition held  constant, are associated with lower public  enroll- 
ments.  34 
31. Clotfelter (1976) finds a negative relationship between mobility and per capita public ex- 
penditures. He measures mobility by  the probability that a recent graduate living in a given state 
will  move out of  the state during at  least one five-year age period during his or her working 
lifetime. 
32. The residual correlation between demand and supply equations was 0.65. 
33. The correlation was -0.38  in the demand system and -0.53  in the supply system. 
34.  A measure of the quality of  private institutions had  essentially no effect on enrollment 
demand and was dropped from the regression. 265  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 













































Public enrollment per capita in  1984 
Four-year enrollment per capita in 1984 
Two-year enrollment per  capita in  1984 
Public expense per capita,  1984 
Comprehensive and liberal arts: total expense per FTE student, 1988 
(median), public 
Two-year: total expense per FTE student, 1988 (median), private 
Two-year: total expense per FTE student, 1988 (median), public 
Comprehensive and liberal arts tuition,  1988 (median), private 
Comprehensive and liberal arts tuition,  1988 (median), public 
Two-year tuition,  1988, private 
Two-year tuition,  1988, public 
Average undergraduate tuition and fees, 1985, public 
Comprehensive and liberal arts: total expense per FTE student,  1988 
(median), private 
Two-year: total expense per FI’E student, 1988 (median), private 
Expense per capita, 1984, private 
Percentage of institutions rated good or excellent in Gourman report 
Percentage of population employed in service industries 
Average undergraduate tuition and fees, 1985, private 
Unemployment rate 
Percentage of  population 18 to 24 
Percentage of population that is black 
Elasticity of combined income and sales tax liability 
Percentage of population that is Hispanic 
Median family income, 1979. 
Percentage of residents of state in  1980 that were not residents in 1975. 
Percentage of population in metropolitan areas 
Geographical price difference 
State appropriation per FTE public student, 1988-89. 
State appropriation per FTE four-year public student, 1988 (EXPLAPUB - 
TCLAPUB) 
State appropriation per FTE two-year public student, 1988 (EXP2YRB - 
T2YRPUB) 
Percentage of population receiving associate of arts degree 
Constant 
Percentage of population receiving bachelor’s degree 
Percentage of population receiving doctoral degree 
CT, DE, ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT 
Percentage of population receiving master’s degree 
IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI 
Rank order of entrance into statehood 
AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV 
AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV,  NM, OK, OR, TX, UT, WA, WY Table 8.3  Student Demand for Public Enrollment 
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*Coefficient is more than twice its standard error. 
Table 8.4  Legislative Supply of Public Enrollment 
~  ~~~ 
Variable  Ordinary Least Squares  Three-Stage Least Squares 
C  -  9.35  -  6.67 
TUITB  -  0.0097*  -0.011* 
(0.0025)  (0.0038) 
INC  0.0020*  0.0018* 
(O.Ooo48)  (O.OOO44) 
YOUNG  261.19*  211.56* 
(1  16.73)  (109.43) 
ELASTI0  8.17*  7.22* 
(2.63)  (2.51) 
PRICE  -0.20  -0.20 
(0.14)  (0.14) 
MOBIL  0.13  0.13 
(0.14)  (0.13) 
BLACK  -  3.67  -4.74 
(10.16)  (9.17) 
HISP  21.59  9.89 
(13.45)  (13.16) 
METRPOP  2.87  1.55 
SUPPB  -0.0023*  -0.0014 
Adjusted R2  0.58  0.53 
Standard error of  regression  5.28  5.67 
(17.47)  (  16.74) 
(4.12)  (3.47) 
(0.00091)  (0.00094) 
*Coefficient is more than twice its standard error. 267  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
Table 8.5 
Variable  Ro-Year  Four-Year 
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*Coefficient is more than twice its standard error. 
We  find, as expected, that the number of service jobs per capita is positively 
related to enrollments. Surprisingly, the sign on the unemployment rate vari- 
able is negative. This could reflect the fact that individuals cannot afford the 
cost of education. More likely, however, this is the result of averaging, since 
the unemployment rate is positively related to enrollment rates in both the 
two-year and the four-year enrollment regressions of table 8.5. 
Finally, the percentage of the population that is age 18 to 24 is positively 
correlated with demand in the overall ordinary least squares regressions and 
in the two-year and four-year regressions. The sign change in the two-stage 
least squares regression is puzzling, although it presumably results from the 
correlation of the unemployment variable with several of the instruments used 
(e.g., METRPOP). 
8.4.2  Legislative Supply 
In the two-stage least squares regression, legislative supply is negatively 
related to the level of  public  tuition per student, as well as to the level of 268  John M. Quigley and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 
Table 8.6  Legislative Suply: lko-  and Four-Year Enrollment 
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*Coefficient is more than twice its standard error. 
appropriation per student. The former result is difficult to interpret; given the 
difficulties of identification, it could merely reflect the negative relationship 
between student demand and tuition. In any case, it is consistent with a pattern 
in which states that choose to support public education by providing for high 
enrollments also support  education  by  offering relatively  low tuitions.  The 
latter result suggests that legislatures recognize the direct trade-off between 
offering a low  subsidy to a large number of students and offering a higher 
subsidy to a smaller group. The elasticity of  -0.15  is similar in magnitude to 
the elasticity of student demand, suggesting that legislatures and students are 
only mildly cost-sensitive. 
We  also  find  that  higher-income  states offer substantially  higher enroll- 
ments, as do states whose populations  tend  to be centered in metropolitan 269  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
areas and that have substantial Hispanic populations (the Southwest).  How- 
ever, states with substantial black populations (including the South) tend to 
offer lower levels of public enr~llment.~~ 
Finally, the elasticity of the tax base is, as expected, a positive and highly 
significant determinant of enrollment rates, a result that is consistent with the 
view that states’ budgeting decisions are sensitive to the political ease with 
which taxes can be raised.  (PRICE and YOUNG also have the expected ef- 
fects.) 
When we look at the two-yeadfour-year  breakdown  of  enrollments from 
the legislative point of view, we find that two-year enrollment rates are very 
sensitive to tuition rates  (at two-year  schools),  while  four-year enrollments 
are much less so (in relation to four-year college tuition).36  Other distinctions 
worth noting include the effect of  mobility (the more mobile the population, 
the lower the two-year enrollments, other things equal) and the state appro- 
priation  (a positive  but  very  small  correlation  between  appropriations and 
four-year enrollments). 
The most important difference between the two- and four-year enrollment 
equations  lies with the  race variables. Both BLACK  and HISP (and also a 
related variable, METRPOP) have substantial positive effects on two-year en- 
rollment rates. This may reflect the fact that black and Hispanic populations 
have formed effective interest groups in terms of achieving  access to public 
higher education in a number of states; the result is consistent with the analy- 
sis of Grubb (1988). The result is surprising; however, it does not seem spu- 
rious-there  is a negative but small simple correlation between the percentage 
of blacks in a state and the per capita enrollment in two-year institutions. 
Also  surprising  is the  substantial negative  relationship between  BLACK 
and HISP and four-year enrollments.  The result  for blacks may reflect to a 
substantial degree the fact that black  populations  are highest in the South, 
where four-year  enrollments  are low.  However,  the  strong  relationship be- 
tween the Hispanic population and four-year enrollments is surprising to us, 
since the overall simple correlation between the two variables is essentially 
zero. 
8.4.3  Expenditures 
As a final exercise, we attempted to explain the statewide variation in ex- 
penditures on public higher education. The first column in table 8.7 describes 
overall per capita expenditures, while  the  second  relates  to per  student ex- 
penditures on two-year and four-year colleges. In addition to some of the con- 
35. When  we allowed for a direct  interaction between legislative supply and private-sector 
alternatives by including ENV as an explanatory variable, we found the coefficient to be negative 
and marginally significant in the ordinary least squares regression, and negative and insignificant 
when two-stage least squares was used. 
36. The two- and four-year equation system was estimated using seemingly unrelated regres- 
sion. The cross-equation residual correlation was -0.3 1. 270  John M. Quigley and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 
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trol variables that we used in the supply-demand equations, we have included 
five additional variables.  The first is an endogenous variable,  the enrollment 
rate,  which  reflects the effect of size on per capita expenditures: a negative 
elasticity  would  suggest that there  are scale economies associated  with  the 
provision  of  higher education, whereas a positive elasticity could reflect the 
additional scope of programs associated with larger enrollments. The remain- 
ing four variables are included to reflect the degree mix of  the students attend- 
ing public institutions. 
The equations in table 8.7 were estimated using two-stage least squares and 
three-stage least squares, respectively.  A number of variables,  shown with a 
prefix L, were introduced in logarithmic form to allow for the direct estima- 
tion of elasticities. For the two-year and four-year schools, the most important 271  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
program-mix variable was the percentage of  students receiving associate of 
arts degrees, the usual two-year degree offered. In addition, the percentage 
receiving master’s and doctor’s degrees had the expected negative effect on 
spending; surprisingly, however, there was  no relationship between per stu- 
dent expenditure and the percentage of bachelor’s degrees offered. 
It is not unexpected to find a strong positive relationship between state ap- 
propriations and expenditures, nor perhaps to find a similar relationship be- 
tween the elasticity of the tax base and spending (the coefficient of ELAST80 
was  high in both expenditure equations). It is more surprising, however, to 
find a relatively low income elasticity of  demand for higher education (ex- 
penditures), although our elasticity of  .31 overall is higher than that found by 
Clotfelter (1976). 
Note also that the price variable had  the expected negative effect in the 
overall equation, but not when the model was restricted to two-year schools 
and four-year colleges. The migration variable had a negative coefficient in 
both equations, consistent with the view that a more mobile population leads 
legislatures to spend less money per pupil on public higher education, other 
things equal. 
8.5  Concluding Remarks 
Our analysis of the statewide patterns of  public enrollments and expendi- 
tures has emphasized the close link between the public and private sectors. 
Because private higher education was dominant in the first 100 years of our 
history, public higher education developed in its shadow. As a result, public 
higher  education  enrollments  and  spending  have  been  highest  primarily 
largely in the West and Midwest, where private educational opportunities have 
historically been limited. 
When  seen from a  cross-sectional point  of  view,  this  historical pattern 
shows up as a negative relationship between public and private enrollment 
rates. A group of primarily eastern states offer a high private enrollment (often 
high-quality), low public enrollment bundle of  higher education opportuni- 
ties,  while a substantial group of  primarily  western and midwestern states 
offer high public (often high-quality), low private enrollment rates. The im- 
portant exception to this general rule is the South, where most states offer low 
public, low private (and generally lower-quality) enrollment bundles. 
What light do our empirical results shed on the alternative theories of public 
choice that we sketched out at the beginning of the paper? The human capital 
and mobility approach is supported, but only weakly, by the negative coeffi- 
cient on the mobility variable that we  obtained in the two-year institutions 
equation (table 8.6) and by the negative coefficients in the per capita expendi- 
ture equations (table 8.7). 
There is also some support for the second public-choice explanation, in 
which politicians use logrolling to trade for forms of  public higher education 272  John M. Quigley and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 
that benefit their constituencies.  The growth of  two-year institutions is con- 
sistent with this view; logrolling may have led to the creation of a large num- 
ber of new institutions in a sufficiently large number of legislative districts so 
as to make the entire educational package politically viable. Note, however, 
that there is only very mild empirical support for the Leviathan perspective on 
the growth of government; in the legislative supply equation, we find higher 
enrollments and higher expenditures to be positively related to the elasticity 
of the tax base. 
The growing emphasis on two-year institutions, especially in the West, is 
also consistent with the view that public education is a means of  distributing 
state resources to the middle class. But this theory does not explain why such 
institutions have been so successful in other areas of the country. 
A  clean, convincing test of  these and other theories  that  explain  public 
choices in public higher education awaits further research. We hope that this 
paper has helped to mark the way. 
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Appendix 
Sources and DeJinitions of Variables 















Percentage of population receiving associate 
of arts degreehumber of earned associate de- 
grees 
As ASSC, but bachelor’s degree 
As ASSC, but doctoral degrees 
Northeastern regionConnecticut ,  Delaware, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp- 
shire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Vermont 
Elasticity of combined income and sales tax li- 
ability/income elasticity of the sum of per- 
sonal income and sales tax liabilities 
Enrollment in public institutions per capita, 
1984lstudents whose programs of study are 
creditable toward a bachelor’s or higher degree 
and also undergrads in one-,  two-,  three-,  or 
four-year  occupational programs which are 
not chiefly creditable toward a bachelor’s de- 
gree, per capita 
Enrollment in four-year public institutions, per 
capita, fall 1984 
Enrollment in two-year public institutions, per 
capita, fall 1984 
Order of statehood 
Enrollment in private institutions per capita, 
1984/as ENB 
Enrollment in four-year private institutions, 
per capita, fall 1984 
Enrollment in two-year private institutions, 
per capita, fall 1984 
Total expenditures per FTE student, 1988, in 
public institutions/median of reported institu- 
tions 

































Total expenditures per FTE student, 1988, in 
comprehensive and liberal arts public institu- 
tiondmedian of reported institutions 
Total expenditures per FTE student, 1988, in 
two-year private institutiondmedian of re- 
ported institutions 
As EXP2YR, but public 
As EXB, but private 
Median family income, 1979/median money 
income of families 
As ASSC, but master’s degrees 
Percentage of population in metropolitan 
areadpercentage in 1 of 261 metropolitan sta- 
tistical areas and 20 consolidated metropolitan 
statistical areas 
Central region/Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wis- 
consin 
Percentage of residents of state in 1980 that 
were not residents in  1975/only includes resi- 
dents over five years of age in 1980 
Geographical price differences/cost of govern- 
ment index, 1988: prices and wages that 
would be paid for a fixed market basket of 
public services 
Poverty normalized/percent of children 1-1  8 
years old below poverty line, 1980 
Proportion of high-quality public institutions/ 
percentage of Gourman-rated public institu- 
tions rated strong or good, rating based on 
size, quality of faculty, depth and breadth of 
curriculum, athletics, etc. 
Proportion of high-quality private institutions/ 
as QUALB 
Percentage of population employed in service 
industries, 1980/ratio of service employees to 
population 
Southeastern regiodAlabama, Arkansas, Flor- 































sippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennes- 
see, Virginia, West Virginia 
State appropriation per FTE private student, 
State Appropriation per RE  public student, 
State appropriation per FTE comprehensive or 
liberal arts student, 1988 (EXPLAPUB - 
TCLAPUB) 
State appropriation per FTE two-year public 
student, 1988 (EXP2YRB -  T2YRPUB) 
As TCLAPUB, but private 
Tuition in comprehensive and liberal arts pub- 
lic institutions, 198Wmedian of reported insti- 
tutions 
As T2YRPUB, but private 
Tuition in two-year public institutions, 19881 
median of reported institutions 
Average undergraduate tuition and fees, pub- 
lic, 1985/mean tuition and fees by  students en- 
rolled 
Tuition of  nonresidents, 1979-80/average tui- 
tion of nonresidents as undergraduates in pub- 
lic institutions 
Tuition of residents, 1979-80/average tuition 
of state residents as undergraduates in public 
institutions 
Average undergraduate tuition and fees, pri- 
vate, 1985/mean tuition and fees by students 
enrolled 
Proportion unemployed, 1980/percentage  of 
labor force not employed 
Western regiodAlaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, 
Utah, Washington, Wyoming 
Proportion of college-age population/percent- 
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Data Sources 
1. U.S.  Department of  Education, National Center for Education Statis- 
2. U.S. Department of  Education, National Center for Education Statis- 
3. U.S. Department of  Education, National Center for Education Statis- 
4. U.S. Department of  Education, National Center for Education Statis- 
5. The Gourman Report. 3rd ed. 1987. Monograph. 
6.  Education Commission of  the States. State postsecondary  education 
structures handbook  1986: State  coordinating and  governing  boards,  no. 
7. U.S.  Department of  Education, National Center for Education Statis- 
tics. Revenues and expenditures for public elementary and secondary educa- 
tion (annual). Statistics of public elementary and secondary day schools (an- 
nual). 
8. National Education Association. Estimates of school statistics (annual) 
(copyright) and unpublished data. Washington, D.C. 
9. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports, series P-25. 
10. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Press release (CB 86-1  18) and unpublished 
data. 
11. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Geographic pro- 
file of employment and unemployment. 
12. U.S.  Department of  Labor, Bureau of  Labor Statistics. Employment 
and earnings. 
13. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental  Relations. Tax capacity of 
the states. 
14. National  Bureau of  Economic Research.  State personal  income and 
sales taxes, 1977-1983.  Daniel R. Feenberg and Harvey S. Rosen. 
15. Research Associates of Washington. State profiles: Financing public 
higher education 1978 to 1990. 
16. Research Associates of Washington. Higher education revenues and ex- 
penditures, vol. 1: Public Institutions. 
17. Research Associates of Washington. Higher education revenues and ex- 
penditures, vol. 2: Private Institutions. 
18. U. S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statis- 
tics. Degrees and other formal awards conferred surveys. 
19.  Paul  Westmeyer.  1985.  A  history  of  American  higher  education. 
Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas. 
20. Jackie M. Johnson.  1980. Resident  and nonresident undergrade and 
graduate tuition andlor required fees, public universities,  colleges and state 
tics. Fall enrollment in higher education. 
tics. Survey of residence and migration of college students. 
tics. Financial statistics of institutions of higher education. 
tics. Education directory: Colleges and universities. Special tabulation. 
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universities, and community colleges. Olympia: Washington State Council for 
Postsecondary Education. 
Comment  Helen F.  Ladd 
Spending on public higher education represents a substantial component of 
many state budgets. In 1989, spending on higher education accounted for 20 
percent of total direct general spending by states and exceeded 25 percent in 
11 states. Given its significance for state budgets, state legislators must con- 
tinually grapple with issues such as how much public higher education to pro- 
vide, of what kinds, at what quality, and at what price to students. 
John Quigley and Daniel Rubinfeld vividly describe the tremendous varia- 
tion in  state policies toward higher education. They show, for example, that 
states in  the West  typically provide extensive access to public colleges and 
universities (as measured by enrollments per 1,000  population) while states in 
the East typically rely less on public provision in favor of private provision. 
Consistent with this finding is a negative relationship between public and pri- 
vate enrollments. Tuitions for public universities as a share of public spending 
vary across states from a low of  6.3 percent in California to a high of  63.6 
percent in Pennsylvania, and the quality of public education varies from very 
high (according to one source) in states such as Arizona, California, and Iowa 
to low in many southern states. The mix between two- and four-year colleges 
also varies across states, with a generally negative relationship between two- 
year and four-year enrollment rates. 
This variation raises a variety of interesting questions about the “legislative 
supply decision,” which is the central focus of  the Quigley and Rubinfeld 
(henceforth QR) paper. In examining public choices in public higher educa- 
tion, the authors have taken an exploratory approach. They have intentionally 
avoided  the  traditional format  of  presenting and  then  testing a  particular 
theory. The result is a paper with a tremendous wealth of information, a model 
that tries to sort out the supply-side determinants from the demand determi- 
nants of enrollments, and a few reflections about alternative theoretical views 
that might be consistent with the enrollment patterns they observe. I have no 
difficulty with the authors’ decision not to test specific theories (the theories 
they discuss in section 8.2 are all quite general and hard to test with any pre- 
cision). However, as I discuss below, the paper’s lack of focus leaves room for 
additional speculation about the underlying objective function of  state legis- 
latures and research focused on specific policy-related questions. 
Helen F.  Ladd is a professor of  public policy studies and economics at Duke University. 279  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
Descriptive Results 
Three major conclusions emerge from the descriptive section of the paper. 
The first has already been mentioned, namely, the tremendous variation in 
policies across states. The second is that public higher education differs quite 
notably from that controlled by  the private sector. Major differences include 
the significantly lower tuitions at public universities and the large presence of 
community, or two-year, colleges. (Another major difference not discussed by 
QR is the higher proportion of in-state students. In my  home state of North 
Carolina, for example, the legislature limits the percentage of out-of-state stu- 
dents to 8 percent, while the proportion of such students at Duke University, 
a private institution, is about 85 percent). These differences suggest that pub- 
lic and private higher education are not perfect substitutes and that, as we try 
to model the legislative supply decision,  we  need  to think quite carefully 
about the nature of the service being provided. 
The third conclusion to emerge from the descriptive analysis is that deci- 
sions about higher education are heavily path dependent and reflect cultural 
and historical factors that are hard to model. The observation that private col- 
leges and universities emerged before public institutions of higher education 
makes it unsurprising that older states rely more heavily on private than on 
public education and that the reverse is true for younger states. Somewhat 
surprisingly, QR  seem to ignore this key role of  history in the model they 
present in the following section of the paper. The notion that  1985 levels of 
variables such as income, employment, tuition, and unemployment are the 
key determinants of 1985 levels of public enrollments seems inconsistent with 
the story they tell in the first section. Consequently, I would be much more 
comfortable with a panel data set that would allow them to focus on how 
changes in the explanatory variables affect changes in enrollments or other 
variables during, say, a 20- or 25-year period. Assembling a panel data set of 
this type, however, would be a formidable task. 
The QR Model 
One of the authors’ contributions is to shift the primary focus away from 
expenditures onto a more appropriate measure of the supply of higher educa- 
tion, namely enrollments. Although enrollments are a measure of inputs, QR 
argue that they are a reasonable proxy for output. Even this measure, however, 
is not without its problems. Presumably, the legislature does not control en- 
rollments directly.  Instead it  controls variables  such  as  admissions policy 
(e.g.,  admission  to  all  applicants  meeting  some  minimal  standard),  the 
amount of resources in the educational system, and tuitions which, together 
with student demand, determine enrollments. Nonetheless, the use of enroll- 
ments can be viewed as a reasonable first step in understanding public choices 
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The starting point for QR's demand equation appears, quite sensibly,' to be 
a model of  investment in human capital. That is, students weigh the costs of 
attending college against the benefits. Costs are measured by tuition and fore- 
gone opportunities as proxied  by the unemployment  rate.  However, the un- 
employment rate  could  be a proxy  for other variables as well  and actually 
enters some of the estimated equations with an unexpected positive sign. Ben- 
efits are measured by an index of quality, expenditures per pupil, and jobs in 
the service sector. The low skill requirements of many service jobs make me 
question how  well this variable proxies job opportunities for college gradu- 
ates, but  at least  it enters the equation  with  the expected  positive  sign. In 
addition, the equation appropriately  includes the cost of alternatives and the 
proportion of the population in the relevant age range. Alternatively, we could 
view higher education as a consumer good. According to this approach, fam- 
ily income should be in the demand equation. Similarly, the racial mix of the 
population may also belong in the equation. I suspect that these variables were 
excluded from the demand equation purely for purposes of identification. 
The specification of the supply side also raises questions,  some related to 
included  variables  and others to important variables  that  are missing.  The 
equation  correctly  includes  the income of  state residents and a measure  of 
their mobility, but both deserve further refinement. Because students from the 
highest-income  families probably choose private colleges and those from the 
lowest-income households often do not attend college, the demand for public 
institutions most likely emanates from the middle class. This observation sug- 
gests that the equation should include measures of the distribution, as well as 
the level, of income. With respect to the mobility variable (measured as the 
proportion  of  residents  living in the  state less than five years),  the authors 
point out that  the  sign should be negative  unless it picks  up the effects of 
population growth, in which case it should be positive. The obvious question 
then becomes, why not control for growth directly in order to sort out the two 
effects? 
Missing from the supply equation is the education level of  the state popu- 
lation. Presumably,  the proportion  of  the  population  with  college  degrees 
could be an important indicator of tastes for public services. Another variable 
missing  from the equation is the  supply of  private-sector  alternatives.  The 
omission of this variable is surprising, given the centrality of the public versus 
private trade-off that emerges from the descriptive analysis. The presence of 
private-tuition  variables  in  the demand  and  some of  the  supply  equations 
helps, but I am not convinced that the tuition variable alone captures the full 
effect of private universities on public enrollments. 
Three main results emerge from the model. The first is the low price elastic- 
ity of demand for higher public education. According to the model, this elas- 
ticity is -  .20 overall and close to 0 for four-year colleges. These estimates 
seem low relative to the consensus from other studies of about -  .70. In ad- 
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states do not raise tuitions. A second result is the role of the elasticity of  the 
tax  base. I must admit that I am suspicious of  the causal link between the 
elasticity of  the tax base and enrollments, since it runs directly counter to 
recent work by  Feenberg and Rosen (1987), whose careful study based on 
panel data provides no support for the hypothesis that the elasticity of the tax 
base affects state spending. I suspect that the QR finding reflects a simultane- 
ity problem: states that provide above-average supplies of public higher edu- 
cation may happen to be those with elastic tax structures.' Finally, the race 
variables  affect  two-year  and  four-year enrollments quite  differently.  The 
greater the proportion of  blacks and Hispanics, the greater the two-year en- 
rollment but the lower the four-year enrollment. Why minority groups would 
push for two-year but oppose four-year institutions is surprising and deserves 
further analysis. 
What Might We  Learn from Additional Work on this Topic? 
Additional work on the supply of  public higher education could take two 
different approaches. The first would be to start with a more explicit objective 
function. Three possible objective functions come to mind. First, in order to 
promote state economic development, legislators could be trying to maximize 
the enrollment of state college-age residents. If this were the goal, they would 
be indifferent between private and public enrollments. Alternatively, in order 
to garner voter support, legislators may  be interested in maximizing enroll- 
ment in  public institutions. Through the  vehicle of  public education, they 
transfer resources to many middle-class residents in the form of  in-kind sub- 
sidies. Finally, state legislators may be motivated by  the desire to maximize 
political support from employees of  state institutions. Working through the 
implications of each of these objective functions might well lead to equations 
that can be more precisely specified than those of  QR and that yield specific 
testable hypotheses. 
Second, additional work could focus on some of  the policy-related ques- 
tions raised  by  the wide variation across states in  the provision  of  public 
higher education. The first set concerns the relationship between public and 
private colleges and universities. The second set concerns tuition policies, and 
the third concerns the mix of public enrollments between two-year and four- 
year institutions. QR provide descriptive information on these questions, but 
their model provides little explanation of the differences across states. 
Substitutability between Public and Private Options 
Why do some states provide extensive systems of public higher education, 
while others do not? The simple answer suggested by QR's descriptive analy- 
1. QR assert that the finding remains when they make the elasticity variable endogenous, but 
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sis is that states will provide more public education the fewer are the private- 
sector opportunities in the state. For example, the New England states, which 
have many high-quality private universities and colleges, have chosen to pro- 
vide limited amounts of higher education through public institutions,  while 
the reverse is true in many western states. But this answer is insufficient since 
it does not explain how states with private institutions are able to resist the 
pressure for public education. As illustrated by QR, private education is not 
the same as public education, especially in terms of tuition. To think about the 
effect of private institutions on public institutions, consider how legislators in 
South Carolina might respond  if  a wealthy donor established  a new,  high- 
quality private university in that state. Given the differences between public 
and private education, it is entirely plausible that state legislators might not 
change their support of public higher education at all. Thus, the first interest- 
ing question is the extent to which the presence of private institutions affects 
the provision of public institutions. 
Despite the puzzles about public-private substitutability that emerge from 
the descriptive part of the paper, QR hardly address this issue in the modeling 
portion of the paper. As noted earlier, neither the quantity nor the quality of 
private-sector options is included in the public-sector supply equation. Con- 
sequently, the QR model can provide no insights about how legislators adjust 
their support for public colleges in response to the differences in private insti- 
tutions. Additional work in this area would be useful. 
A related question concerns the responsiveness of  private enrollments to 
changes in the quality and quantity of public opportunities. The current state 
budget  crunch  has  forced  many  states to reduce appropriations  for public 
higher education and to raise tuitions. To the extent that public and private 
education  are  substitutes,  one would  predict  that  the  deterioration  in  the 
public-sector options induced by the budget crunch would lead to increased 
demand  for private-sector  options.  To  determine the magnitude of  this re- 
sponse, the level of enrollments in the private sector would need to be mod- 
eled explicitly as a function of, among other variables, the quality, quantity, 
and price of public-sector options. 
Tuition policy 
Why do tuitions at public universities vary across states? Why, for example, 
does North Carolina charge low tuitions and Michigan high tuitions? The dif- 
ference in the average income of residents in the two states probably provides 
a substantial part of the answer. However, even if income differences account 
for a large portion of the cross-state variation in tuition policy, one would still 
want to explore the reasons why income matters. What goals are legislators 
trying to achieve in providing low-price public colleges and universities? Are 
they keeping the price low to transfer resources to middle-income taxpayers 
or because they believe low tuitions will foster economic growth? Taken at its 
face value, the QR conclusion that the price elasticity of demand for four-year 283  Public Choices in Public Higher Education 
colleges is zero suggests that maintaining low tuitions  at four-year colleges 
has no effect on enrollments and consequently may have little impact on the 
supply of  human capital in the state.  Additional insights about goals might 
also emerge from a close examination of the ratio of in-state to out-of-state 
tuitions  and about admissions policies.  In any case, there is room here for 
more research. 
In  addition  to  understanding  more  about  the  variation  in  tuition  levels 
across states, it would be desirable to learn more about the political or budget- 
ary pressures  that induce  states to increase tuition  at public  universities.  It 
would also be interesting to find out how, if at all, the structure of tuitions is 
changed as tuitions are raised.  A comparative analysis of  changes in tuition 
policies during both the  1990-91  recession and the 1981-82  recession might 
produce  some  interesting  insights  into  the  political  economy  of  tuition 
changes. 
Composition of Public Systems 
Finally, it would be worthwhile to try to understand more about the com- 
position  of public systems.  QR describe the recent dramatic growth in two- 
year colleges. Why did they grow faster in some states than in others? Again, 
a better understanding of the objectives of state policymakers would be help- 
ful. Related to the two-yeadfour-year mix is the more general question of how 
states allocate funds among the different parts of the university system. How 
are flagship campuses treated relative to other campuses? Are there swings in 
support over time for flagship campuses and, if  so, why? In this regard,  it 
might be interesting to look at the role graduates of state schools play in the 
state legislature. More generally, one might investigate the lobbying power of 
employees in state higher education.  Presumably, once a state system is set 
up, the education establishment provides a natural lobbying group in the form 
of state employees. 
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